A hazard and risk analysis (H&RA) of events or systems, which have multiple preventive or mitigative safety features, usually requires the application of redundancy rules in order to arrive at a credible answer. The process industry typically refers to these preventive or mitigative safety features as protection layers. Aggregate system safety performance assessments can become complicated because of the application of those redundancy rules to the individual protection layers. In industrial engineering settings there is a desire to simplify such assessments. A first simplification can be readily done by expanding the series, of the individual reliability functions, and using only the first two terms.This is acceptable when is small enough; e.g., (
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Introduction
Proper risk management is a pre-requisite for an organization's sustainability in a competitive environment. In the process industry, risk management is foremost associated with meeting operational requirements, in a safe and reliable manner. The success of risk management depends on several factors which include appropriate implementation tools and accurate risk information. Risk information has to be of a quality that enables decisionmakers to make risk-informed decisions. The information can be acquired through quantitative, semi-quantitative or qualitative risk assessment techniques. Results of such assessments should always be accompanied by an indication of their accuracy; this has often been a weak point. The Risø-R-1344 report [1] evaluated competitive quantitative risk analyses, done on defined hazards by experts; it showed that results can vary by several orders of magnitude. It is to be expected that results of risk assessments, performed by non-experts, would be subject to an even wider range of divergence in risk assessment results. This will be true for industry staff charged with doing a H&RA when their daily tasks involves dealing with engineering and operational issues. The process industry generally favors qualitative and semi-quantitative assessments, because they put fewer constraints on limited resources and time, than rigorous quantitative risk assessments. A semi-quantitative risk analysis implies that either the consequence or the probability/frequency part of the analysis needs to be done quantitatively. In the process industry this is; however, often not the case and a semi-quantitative label can be assigned to an approach that relies on parameterized opinions. Numerical results of such semi-quantitative methods, without an uncertainty indication, need to be used with care. For example, Layer of Protection Analysis, or LOPA [2] alleges to be accurate within one order of magnitude, a claim that is untenable when compared with the results of [1] .
LOPA
LOPA is a self-proclaimed order-of-magnitude risk analysis method that builds on qualitative hazard evaluations such as HazOp Studies. Its goal is to analyze selected scenarios and thereby assess whether the risk posed by each scenario has been reduced, through safeguards or IPLs, to a residual value that is deemed acceptable. If, after accounting for the IPLs, the residual risk is still too high,additional risk reduction will be needed. This will usually be a Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) [3, 4] with enough safety integrity to meet the required risk goal. LOPA measures IPL performance in terms of a probability of failure upon demand or PFD, which is an unfortunate choice.In reality IPL performance is given by an average PFD, or PFD avg , which is measured over the time interval of its maintenance cycle.
The promise of a simple tool to perform risk analyses, combined with the benefit of being able to use prescreened HazOp scenarios makes LOPA a tempting safety engineering process for the process industry. This is especially true for organizations that routinely perform HazOps, such as oil refineries and the larger (petro) chemical manufacturers. Embracing LOPA by these large players has resulted in a large number of publications, some of which with default (PFD avg ) values for IPLs that are commonly used in process designs. Such impromptu databases are frequently used without analyzingpotential differencesthat could preclude their use such as differences with respect to: Environment. Design. Operating conditions. Maintenance and proof test interval requirements.
Further H&RA streamlining occurs when published data are augmented with in-house generated or "believed" IPLPFD avg dataand applicable mathematical restrictions are ignored. The LOPA process relies on pre-screened scenarios that are analyzed in terms of "initiating event -loss event" chains. It ignores mutually exclusive initiating events that result in the same loss event; this can result in an under-estimation of the overallinitiating event likelihood, especially in repetitive systems. Another simplification, which is not legitimate, is the fact that LOPA determines a preventive systems "PFD" by a simple multiplication of the PFD avg values of the available preventive action IPLs. While both prevention and mitigation IPLs will lower the risk of the scenario; the preventive IPLs are important from theirlikelihood modification perspective and the issues surrounding their parallel redundancy calculations.
Redundancies

Parallel redundancy
Parallel redundancy characterizes a situation where several IPLs exist that each, individually, can prevent an initiating event from evolving into an undesired consequence. In essence all preventive IPLs must fail before the consequence can materialize. Multi-tiered safeguards are commonly the topic of LOPA and Bow-Tie studies. An IPL that operates in a constant failure rate domain ( (t)), and that consist of a single piece of equipment or a series of components, has a PFD that is given by [5] :
The term in (1) represents the reliability. It can be readily expanded without a major error as long as is sufficiently small; e.g., < 0.01. In such a case it is common to take the first two expansion terms; i.e., ( , which yields:
An average IPL PFD for a time interval T can be calculated for (2) by integration from t=0 to t=T and division by T:
The aggregate or system PFD of a system consisting of a number of IPLs is defined by:
For a system protected by three parallel redundant IPLs, the system PFD(t) can be written as PFD 1oo3 (t) = PFD IPL1 (t) × PFD IPL2 (t) × PFD IPL3 (t). When assumingidentical and constant failure rates the PFD 1oo3 (t) can be rewritten as: (5) PFD 1oo3 in (Eq. 5) has three exponential terms which show that a series expansion will not be straightforward. Furthermore while each of the IPLs had identical and constant failure rates; this will not be the case for the system's aggregate failure rate. Therefore when an average system PFD needs to be determined for systems with parallel redundancy then it should be done through proper integration and time averaging, as required by IEC [6] . LOPA ignores these requirements and calculates an aggregate system PFD avg by merely multiplying the PFD avg of the individual IPLs. This Boolean approach is fundamentally incorrect and can result in a gross under-estimation of risk for a system that is protected by multi-tiered IPLs.
Serial and mixed redundancy
The PFD(t) of a serial redundant system is defined by: (6) Safety systems are often a mix of parallel and serial redundancies because different safety or operational aspects; e.g., avoiding spurious trips need to be satisfied. Examples of system with different redundancies are shown in Fig.  1 ; the objective in each case is to maintain flow from S (start) to F (finish). Figure 1 Table 1 lists several common systems with their PFD avg as determined through a rigorous integration, IEC integration and simple Boolean multiplication of the PFD avg of a 1oo1 system. Fig. 2 displays the PFD avg performance graphs for a 1oo3 system with parallel redundancy for these determination methods. Table 1 .PFDavgfor common systems (using rigorous integration of exponential equations; IEC approach, using integration of expanded single systems; and the Boolean approach, by multiplication of PFDavg of a single system (using it as a true probability).
Setup
PFDavgdetermined by rigorous integration of exponential equations [7] PFDavg as per IEC:
PFDavgBoolean: 
Single initiating event -loss event relationships
In order to avoid complexity, LOPA focuses on a single initiating event -loss event relationships; i.e., by design it overlooks relationships between different initiating events that result in the same consequence. Erratic initiating event identification, as often happens in hazard and risk analyses, results then too often in a failure to account for the multiple initiating events leading to a single loss event.
For example, in a hydrogen plant, water can be carried over from the process steam system to the reformer and cause awater -steam transition explosion. Initiating events include condensate accumulation during an intermittent shutdown, pump issues and flow control issues. HazOps are not good at identifying common consequence events and LOPA avoids them. Consequentlythe phase transition risk could end up being allocated to several sub-scenarios. The risk of each sub-scenario will be lower than the overall phase transition explosion risk. It is possible that the allocation will render each unique initiating event -loss event chain incrementally tolerable even when the overall risk is unacceptable. Similarly, it is possible that the incremental risks will be just above the tolerable threshold and result in over-protection. Another possibility is that the process hazard analysis team decides that a single subscenario is representative for the overall risk and move on; i.e., abdicates its responsibilities.
Different definitions
Differences in definitions for common terms in the IEC standards and LOPA literature has been a recurring source of discussion and arguments in H&RAs. This has resulted in different project teams coming up with different solutions for similar problems. Important differences, from a H&RA perspective are:
Independent protection layer (IPL): where the IEC standard 61511 Part 3 specifies a necessary risk reduction attribute of a factor of 100 [8] versus the 2001 LOPA book that uses a factor of 10 [9] . Independent: where the IEC standard 61508 Part 1 [10] specifies "If the control system, SIS and other risk reduction measures are to be treated as independent for the allocation (of risk reduction measures), they shall be independent such, that the likelihood of simultaneous failures between two or more of these different systems or measures is sufficiently low, in relation to the required safety integrity; not share common parts, services or support systems (for example power supplies) whose failure could result in a dangerous mode of failure of all systems. Not share common operational, maintenance or test procedures" versus the 2001 LOPA book that focuses on hardware.
The industry typically follow the LOPA definitions; a strict interpretation of the IEC standard's clause of not sharing "common operational, maintenance or test procedures" would be somewhat difficult to justify because nonroutine activities tend to be more hazard prone.
Target risk reduction values for safety instrumented functions
Assigning a SIL to a specific SIF isfrequently done using qualitative tools such as a SIL graph [11] or a risk matrix thatexpresses a required risk reduction in terms of a SIL. This creates a SIS design dilemma because a SIL number represents a range rather than an explicit RRF value (see Table 2 ). Where such a qualitative approach is used, the IEC requires that the specified target failure measure will be the SIL's smallest PFD avg (or greatest RRF avg ) [12] . Technical literature and commercial SIF architecture design reports often gloss over this IEC requirement. While this IEC "err on the safe side" position is common sense; it also means that SIS designs will overshoot the target. An acceptable average safety integrity design for a SIF would be somewhere from 2/3 rd to its full range. For a SIF with a SIL 2 it means that its design must have an RRF avg range of > 667 and up to and including 1,000. Table 3 provides a specimenof an actual report that ignored the IEC greater RRF requirement and therefore contains flawed target risk reduction statements. 
Discussion
The 1oo3 system PFD avg curves in Fig. 2 show the (Boolean) approach as producing an outlying curve while the (Exp. Eq.) and (EIC) curves seem to be much closer. This happens to be true for T > 35,040 hours (4 years), at which time the (IEC) curve understates the risk of failure on demand by less than 33 percent; i.e., 1.34444E-06 versus 1.98917E-06. Unfortunately, a maintenance frequency of once every four years is very common in the process industry and the error at shorter time intervals is much greater. At T = 8,760 hours (1 year) the (IEC) approach understates the actual PFD avg , which was calculated rigorously from exponential equations without simplifications, by a factor of 33. This put the validity of using PFD avg equations that have been simplified by exponential series expansion for parallel systems into question. This is in addition to an error that will exist because of the neglect of common cause failures.
It was further found that there are potentially several serious deficiencies with popular H&RA methodologies; e.g., LOPA. An important deficiency affects the process of how the scope of a SIL analysis is populated from a hazard identification tool such as HazOp. Other deficiencies arise from the rather arbitrary (one cause-one consequence) LOPA simplification rules and misinterpretation of IEC standards because a SIL number represents a range rather than a crisp number. This misinterpretation can cause a SIS design safety requirements specification to have flawed; i.e., RRF avg targets that are too low (see Table 3 ).
The findings give credence to the observation that accuracies of semi-quantitative H&RAs are overstated and secondly, because the deficiencies have an "unsafe" trend, the results of H&RAs should be reviewed closely and taking "iffy" IPL credits avoided.
Conclusions
Multi-layered safeguards' actual risk reduction performance will fall short of what a LOPA would suggest. Qualitative and "semi-quantitative" H&RAs that rely on a "single initiating event -loss event relationships" can be subject to serious shortcomings when the analysis team does not account for common-cause -loss event scenarios. The properties, and limitations -especially those related to proof test intervals, of PFD avg should be explained to H&RA teams before the start of an H&RA. Expressing a SIF's desired risk reductionin terms of a SIL number; i.e., a range, rather than an actual target value is not helpful. It creates confusion and provides opportunities for design and risk misinterpretation.
